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1 Introduction
In the last decades, the EU has attributed great prominence to Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR), “A concept whereby companies integrate so-
cial and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their
interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (see Green Paper,
2001). In the Green Paper (2001), CSR is defined as an instrument which
can promote “a positive contribution to the strategic goal decided in Lisbon:
to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in
the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better
jobs and greater social cohesion” (see the Green Paper, 2001, p. 6). The
expansion of CSR is then considered as crucial for the EU Institution. How-
ever, even if, nowadays, an increasing number of firms started to promote
CSR, CSR market is still a small proportion of the total annual household
consumer spend (see for instance the The Co-operative Bank, 2007). This
can be partly explained by the fact that commodities produced in the CSR
market are usually more expensive than traditional ones. Several studies
show that consumers that purchase CSR commodities are usually charac-
terized by a medium-high level of income (see for instance Livraghi, 2007,
D’Alessio et al., 2007).
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the link between CSR and
income distribution. Our main finding is that under certain circumstances
there exists a virtuous circle which ties increases in the diffusion of CSR to
reductions in income inequality. This result has strong policy implications
if public authority considers both CSR growth and inequality reduction as
two crucial policy goals.
Research into CSR can be traced back to a crucial question of political
and economic debate: whether firms have any kind of social responsibility
beyond employment, production of goods and services and the maximization
of profits (Friedman, 1970). This kind of responsibility in firms decisions
has been underestimated by neoclassical theory. However, the dichotomy
between theoretical conclusions and actual firms’ behavior appears puzzling.
Because of this, not surprisingly, CSR research has mainly focused on why
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firms choose to internalized social cost beyond legal constraints.1 To answer
this question, some scholars introduce the concept of CSR in an oligopoly
framework with product differentiation, since this approach is seen as the
natural tool able to solve the mentioned dichotomy. The fact that a group
of consumers is concerned about social traits of products is the foundation
of the existence of firms that commit on CSR. Contributions in this strand
of literature are, for instance, Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995), Amacher
et al. (2004), Alves and Santos-Pinto (2008), Becchetti and Solferino (2003),
Conrad (2005), Davies (2005), Mitrokostas and Petrakis (2008).2 We follow
this literature by assuming that some consumers are socially responsible,
and that CSR is modeled as a variable cost that affects the prices of firms in
the ethical sector. By contrast, we adopt a general equilibrium perspective.3
This approach allows us to go a step forward in the understanding of CSR,
that is, it allows us to investigate the relationship between CSR growth and
income inequality. Such a relationship cannot be properly analyzed in a
partial equilibrium set-up. The role of income distribution in the diffusion
of CSR , to the best of our knowledge, has not been yet analyzed, even if, as
shown by Livraghi (2007) and D’Alessio et al. (2007), it is a crucial variable
in the determination of CSR demand.
We present a simple version of a general equilibrium model. The economy
is divided in two sectors, the traditional and the ethical one. We refer
to the latter as the sector where CSR firms operate. Moreover, a share
of consumers is concerned with the social attributes of products. Hence,
social responsibility is incorporated in the model both in production and
consumption decisions. Two hypotheses are crucial for our findings: i) only
a group of workers receive a share of profits in addition to wages, and ii) a
group of consumers – socially responsible consumers – entirely spend their
income in the ethical sector if their income is enough to afford the purchase
1A critical survey on this debate is Kitzmueller (2008).
2One of the main differences between this strand of literature and the conventional
product differentiation approach is that CSR is modeled as a variable cost rather than a
sunk or fixed cost (see Alves and Santos-Pinto, 2008).
3Applications of CSR to a general equilibrium set-up has not been deeply analyzed
so far. An example in this direction can be found in Becchetti and Adriani (2004) that
analyze a North-South model of trade, where a single consumption good is produced in
the two countries. However, income distribution does not affect the equilibrium outcome
in their model.
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of a given quantity of goods at the price of the ethical good.4 This implies
that consumers’ behavior is affected not only by preferences but also by
income distribution. Hence, we can investigate whether income inequality
is a deterrent to CSR growth.
Under these assumptions the model admits multiple equilibria, each of
them characterized by a different extent of ethical sector. Indeed, preferences
and the presence of two classes of income can produce three different cases:
all the labour force can afford CSR goods, only workers getting the share of
profits can afford them, no one can do it. The price of CSR goods determines
which of these situations emerges. Since the dimension of ethical sector
affects the price of CSR goods, it is possible that, for some extents of ethical
sector, the system switches from one case to another. We examine below the
conditions under which these discontinuities generate multiple equilibria.
This result is important not only because different extents of ethical
sector can be sustained at equilibrium, but also because we found that under
plausible conditions the increase in the dimension of CSR is associated to a
reduction of inequality. In this case there exists a virtuous circle between
the two policy goals. Therefore, any policy which promotes the diffusion
of CSR induces a reduction of income inequality. When those conditions
do not apply, we show that only redistributive policies can induce both a
reduction of inequality and an increase in the diffusion of CSR.
Next Section introduces the main features of the model. Section 3 de-
scribes the assumptions on preferences and income distribution. In Section
4, we investigates the equilibrium configurations of the model. In Section
5, we give a brief description of the dynamics. In Section 6, we find the
circumstances under which there exists the virtuous circle. In Section 7 we
investigate the consequences of two kinds of policies that affect preferences
for CSR and income distribution. Section 8 concludes.
2 A General Equilibrium Model
The economy is divided in two sectors, the Traditional (T) and the Ethical
(E) one. Both produce a single good with two similar technologies which
4Otherwise, their income is entirely spent in traditional sector.
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only differ for their ethical dimension. The ethical sector (hereafter, E-
sector) respects the criteria of ethicality and has access to a certification,
this does not apply to the traditional sector (hereafter, T-sector). In order to
respect the criteria, firms must pay an additional cost for any unit produced,
c. We denote wE and wT the wage of E and T-sector respectively. In both
sectors, firms maximize profits. Profits are equally shared among a quota,
σ ∈ (0, 1], of the labour force, L, independently by the sector where they
work. Since we assume full employment in the economy, the sum of workers
in E and T-sector – LE and LT respectively – must be equal to L, that is
LE + LT = L. (1)
For the sake of clarity, we define the share of workers employed in the T-
sector as
γ =
LT
L
, (2)
and 1− γ as the share of workers employed in the E-sector.
Consumers choose to buy ethical or traditional commodities according
to their preferences and their income. Demands can be defined as follows
DT =
1
pT
[λTwTγL+ λEwE(1− γ)L+ λΠΠ], (3)
and
DE =
1
pE
[(1− λT )wTγL+ (1− λE)wE(1− γ)L+ (1− λΠ)Π], (4)
where Di – with i ∈ (E, T ) – is the demand for each sector, and pi the price
of the good in sector i; wTγL and wE(1 − γ)L are the total wages in T
and E-sector respectively, and Π are total profits; λT is the share of income
spent in the T-sector coming from workers employed in the T-sector, λE is
the share of income spent in the T-sector coming from workers employed in
the E-sector, λΠ is the share of total profits spent in the T sector.
We assume that the production in the two sectors follows a Cobb-Douglas
technology. Hence the two production functions are T (LT ) = BL
β
T with
B > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1), and E(LE) = ALαE with A > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1), in
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the traditional and in the E-sector respectively. From equation (2) we can
rewrite the two productions as
T (γ) = BγβLβ, (5)
and
E(γ) = A(1− γ)αLα. (6)
Total profits are given by
Π = ΠT + ΠE , (7)
where, given (2), (5) and (6)
ΠT = pTT (γ)− wTγL, (8)
ΠE = (pE − c)E(γ)− wE(1− γ)L. (9)
Profits maximization implies
wT = pTT ′(γ), (10)
wE = (pE − c)E′(γ), (11)
where T ′(γ) ≡ ∂T (LT )∂LT = βBγβ−1Lβ−1, and E′(γ) ≡
∂E(LE)
∂LE
= αA(1 −
γ)α−1Lα−1. Defining the traditional commodity as numeraire, pT = 1, from
(2), (10), (5), (6) and (11), the following holds
wT = T ′(γ) = βBγβ−1Lβ−1, (12)
and,
wE = (pE − c)E′(γ) = (pE − c)αA(1− γ)α−1Lα−1. (13)
Labour is perfectly mobile, hence at equilibrium the wages in the two sectors
must be equal, that is w ≡ wE = wT . Hence, from (12), and (13), we have:
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pE =
T ′(γ)
E′(γ)
+ c =
βB(1− γ)1−α
αAγ1−β
Lβ−α + c. (14)
Since ethical commodities are usually more expensive than traditional ones,
we assume c > 1, which, from (14) implies pE > pT = 1 for any γ ∈ [0, 1].
From equations (2), (5), (6), (8), (9), (10), (11) and (14) we obtain:
Π = Bγβ−1Lβ
[
γ − β + β
α
(1− γ)
]
. (15)
At equilibrium, a vector of prices p∗ = {p∗T , p∗E} ensures that demand and
supply in each sector are equalized, i.e. DT = T (γ) and DE = E(γ).
From equation (3) and (5), the condition DT = T (γ) implies that
γ∗ ≡ αβ(λE − λΠ) + βλΠ
α+ αβ(λE − λT ) + λΠ(β − α) . (16)
When γ = γ∗, the price vector cleans both markets and hence p = p∗. Since
∂pE(γ)
∂γ < 0, ∀γ ∈ [0, 1], in order to study the features of the equilibria it is
convenient to focus on the share of workers employed in the two sectors,
which directly measures the degree of E-sector development.
3 Preferences and Income Distribution
In the previous Section a general form for demands was considered. Here,
according to consumer preferences and income distribution we characterize
the equilibria. We assume that there are two types of consumers, ethical
and standard. The share of ethical consumers is denoted by φ ∈ (0, 1), while
traditional ones are 1− φ. Both types spend entirely their income in one of
the two sectors.5 Standard consumers are not interested in ethical aspects
and purchase the good where the price is lower, that is in the T-sector.
Thus, for any standard consumer, we have:
ωi,s = pT qT , (17)
5This assumption is strong, however, our effort is to build a very simple model, accord-
ing to Occam’s razor principle. Moreover, assuming that consumers spend their income
in both sectors, would not modify the qualitative results of our model.
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where ωi,s is the income of the i-th standard consumer. On the other hand
ethical consumers have hierarchical preferences: they would purchase the
good according to the minimum price if and only if their income does not
allow for buying a certain quantity, q¯, while they would only buy the ethical
goods otherwise.Thus, for any ethical consumer:
ωi,e =
{
pT qT , if ωi,e < pE q¯,
pEqE , otherwise
(18)
where ωi,e is the income of the i-th ethical consumer.6
A share of the population σ receive besides the wages an equal fraction
θ of total profits. From equation (15):
θ ≡ Π
σL
=
Bγβ−1Lβ−1
σ
[
γ − β + β
α
(1− γ)
]
, (19)
A share (1 − σ) of the labour force receive only wages. For the sake of the
argument, both workers employed in the T and the E-sector may receive
the share of profits. Since wE = wT , we obtain only two different classes
of income: a share (1 − σ) of workers gets w, while a share σ gets w + θ
independently of the sector where they work. This implies that the share
of labour income spent in each of the two sectors is the same, and we can
define λw ≡ λE = λT .
Since at the price pE the expenditures for buying at least q¯ units in
the E-sector is pE q¯, only consumers receiving ωi > pE q¯ may purchase the
ethical good. Thus, depending on consumers’ preferences and on the relation
between ωi and pE q¯, we obtain the following values of λw and λΠ:
λw =

1− φ if w ≥ pE q¯,
1− σφ if w < pE q¯ ≤ w + θ,
1 if pE q¯ > w + θ;
(20)
λΠ =
{
1− φ if w + θ ≥ pE q¯,
1 if pE q¯ > w + θ.
(21)
6The behavior of the two types of consumers in equations (17) and (18) can be ob-
tained through the maximization of the following utility functions: for standard con-
sumers, U(T,E) = T + E; for ethical consumers,
u(T,E) =
{
T
1+T
q¯, if E < q¯,
E, otherwise.
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The values of λi represent the share of income spent in the T-sector (while,
1 − λi is the share of income spent in the E-sector). All the possible com-
binations of pE q¯ intervals generate for each sector, a piecewise continuous
demand function. Indeed, as both pE and w depend on γ, any increase in
the E-sector can affect the consumers’ behavior – i.e. λi. In the T sector,
from equations (3), (15), (20) and (21), we have that:
DT (γ) =

DT1(γ) if pE q¯ ≤ w,
DT2(γ) if w < pE q¯ ≤ w + θ,
DT3(γ) if w + θ < pE q¯;
(22)
where
DT1(γ) = (1− φ)f(γ)
[
γ +
β
α
(1− γ)
]
; (23)
DT2(γ) = f(γ)[φ[β(1− σ)− γ] + β
α
(1− γ)(1− φ)]; (24)
DT3(γ) = f(γ)
β
α
(1− γ); (25)
and f(γ) = Bγβ−1Lβ. Firms in the T-sector face a demand DT1 if all
the consumers receive enough to buy the ethical good, pE q¯ ≤ w; DT2 if
only consumers receiving the profits’ share can afford the ethical good, w <
pE q¯ ≤ w + θ; and DT3 if no one receives enough to buy the ethical good,
w + θ < pE q¯. Hence, for a given γ, DT1 ≤ DT2 ≤ DT3. Furthermore, it is
easy to prove that
∂DT i(γ)
∂γ
< 0, ∀γ ∈ [0, 1] (26)
with i = 1, 2, 3. The sign of the derivative of DT i is important in the
description of the system dynamics (see Section 6).
4 Excess demand and equilibria
Let us define Z(γ) = DT (γ) − T (γ) the excess demand function in the
T-sector. Given the shape of the demand function, Z(γ) is a piecewise
continuous function.
Z(γ) =

Z1(γ) if pE q¯ ≤ w,
Z2(γ) if w < pE q¯ ≤ w + θ,
Z3(γ) if w + θ < pE q¯;
(27)
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where Zj(γ) = DT j(γ)− T (γ) with j = 1, 2, 3, and Z1(γ) ≤ Z2(γ) ≤ Z3(γ)
∀γ. The market clears if Z(γ) = 0. Each Zj(γ) is equal to zero for the
following values of γ:
γ∗Z1 =
β(1− φ)
αφ+ (1− φ)β ; (28)
γ∗Z2 =
αβφ(1− σ) + β(1− φ)
αφ+ β(1− φ) ; (29)
γ∗Z3 = 1. (30)
Hence, γ∗Z1 is an equilibrium if and only if pE(γ
∗
Z1
)q¯ ≤ w(γ∗Z1), γ∗Z2 if and
only if w(γ∗Z2) < pE(γ
∗
Z2
)q¯ ≤ w(γ∗Z2)+θ(γ∗Z2), and γ∗Z3 if and only if w(γ∗Z3)+
θ(γ∗Z3) < pE(γ
∗
Z3
)q¯. Moreover, from (28), (29) and (30), it follows 0 ≤ γ∗Z1 ≤
γ∗Z2 ≤ γ∗Z3 .
A numerical illustration of the model is represented in Figure 1. The first
graph shows the curve q¯pE(γ), w(γ) and w(γ) + θ(γ). The second graph
displays the excess demand function in the T-sector, which is denoted by
the thickest curve. The lowest curve Z1(γ) shows the case in which all the
labor force is able to purchase the ethical good – q¯pE(γ) ≤ w(γ), the middle
curve Z2(γ) the case in which only the laborers who get the share of profits,
θ, are able to purchase the ethical good – w(γ) ≤ q¯pE(γ) ≤ w(γ) + θ(γ),
while the highest curve Z3(γ) the case in which nobody is able to purchase
it – w(γ) + θ(γ) < q¯pE(γ). In the interval [0, γ¯] the excess demand function
assumes the value Z1(γ) (since q¯pE(γ) ≤ w(γ)); between (γ¯, γ¯] the value
Z2(γ) (since w(γ) ≤ q¯pE(γ) ≤ w(γ) + θ(γ)); and between (γ¯, 1] the value
Z1(γ) (since again q¯pE(γ) ≤ w(γ)). In Figure 1, the excess demand function
does not assume the value Z3(γ) since for any γ richest consumers can always
afford the ethical good. In this example the model admits two equilibria:
γ∗Z1 and γ
∗
Z2
. In particular, the E-sector is wider at γ∗Z1 than at γ
∗
Z2
.7
We can give an intuition for the emergence of multiple equilibria. The
shape of the three curves in the first graph of Figure 1 is due to the fact
that different values of γ determine non-linear changes in wages, profits and
7Note that in this example, γ∗Z3 is not an equilibrium since when γ = 1 both the curves
w(γ) and w(γ) + θ(γ) are above pE(γ)q¯ curve.
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γ¯
r
γ¯
r
Z2(γ)
Z1(γ)
Z3(γ)
Z(γ)
γ∗Z1
r
γ∗Z2
r
pE(γ)q¯
w(γ) + θ(γ)
w(γ)
γ
γ
1
1
0
0
Figure 1: The first picture shows the graph of pE q¯, w and w+ θ, as functions of γ. The
interceptions between pE q¯ and the other functions determine the intervals of the excess
demand function. The second picture shows the graph of the excess demand function –
i.e. the red piecewise curve. Values of parameters: c = 1, φ = 0.7, σ = 0.6, q¯ = 1, L = 100,
α = 0.8, β = 0.7, B = 8, A = 6.
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relative prices. Hence, not surprisingly, it is possible that for a certain value
of γ all the consumer may afford the purchase of ethical good, while for a
different value of γ, only richest consumers can do it. This explain why Z(γ)
is a piecewise function. In its points of discontinuity, the demands of the two
sectors change suddenly, and it is possible to switch from an excess of supply
to an excess of demand – as at point γ¯ – and the other way round. Although
the dynamics of the model is analyzed in the next Section, it is evident that
this change would make market forces work in opposite directions, driving
the system towards different equilibria.
The number of equilibria which arise depends on the intersections be-
tween w(γ) and pE(γ)q¯, and between w(γ) + θ(γ) and pE(γ)q¯. If there is no
intersection the model shows only one equilibrium.
i. If w > pE q¯ for any γ ∈ [0, 1], the fraction of ethical consumers φ can
always demand the ethical good, thus the excess of demand in the
T-sector is given by Z1, and for γ∗Z1 the market clears.
ii. If w + θ > pE q¯ > w for any γ ∈ [0, 1], only the ethical consumers
receiving the share of profits θ demand the ethical good, thus the
excess of demand in the T-sector is given by Z2, and for γ∗Z2 the market
clears.
iii. If pE q¯ > w+θ > w for any γ ∈ [0, 1], no one is rich enough to consume
the ethical good, thus the excess of demand in the T-sector is given
by Z3, and the only equilibrium is γ∗Z3 = 1, i.e. the E-sector does not
exist.
If instead, w(γ) and/or w(γ) + θ(γ) intersect pE(γ)q¯, the model admits
multiple equilibria.
iv. If w ∩ pE q¯, and w + θ > pE q¯ for any γ ∈ [0, 1], for some values of
γ the fraction of ethical consumers φ can demand the ethical good,
and Z = Z1, while for other values of γ only the ethical consumers
receiving the share of profits θ demand the ethical good, and Z = Z2.
Thus both the equilibria γ∗Z1 and γ
∗
Z2
may arise – which is the case
drawn in Figure 1.
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v. If w + θ ∩ pE q¯, and w < pE q¯ for any γ ∈ [0, 1], for some values of
γ only the ethical consumers receiving the share of profits θ demand
the ethical good, and Z = Z2, while for other values of γ no one is
rich enough to consume the ethical good, and Z = Z3. Thus both the
equilibria γ∗Z2 and γ
∗
Z3
may arise.
vi. If w ∩ pE q¯ and w + θ ∩ pE q¯, the excess demand functions takes the
values of the three arguments in γ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus all the three equilibria
may, in principle, arise.
Furthermore, when w(γ) and/or w(γ) + θ(γ) intersect pE(γ)q¯, the model
admits the existence of limit cycles. This happens if and only if, given
γ1, γ2 ∈ [0, 1] and γ2 = γ1 + , ∀ arbitrarily small  > 0, it holds
i. Z(γ1) = Zi(γ1) and Z(γ2) = Zj(γ1), with i > j;
ii. Z(γ1) > 0 and Z(γ2) < 0.
Figure 2 clarify this result. In γ∗∗ the excess demand function jumps from
a positive to a negative value. Although prices do not clear the markets,
market forces tend to keep the relative extent of the two sectors around γ∗∗
– i.e. γ∗∗ is a fixed point.8
The analysis presented above took into account all the possible model
configurations. The following result holds.
Proposition 4.1. The model always admits at least a fixed point.
Proof. In our model, any Zi(γ), for i = 1, 2, 3, is a decreasing function of
γ, Z(0) ≥ 0, Z(1) ≤ 0, and the excess demand function is always defined
in all its domain. Given this properties, we have the following results. If
Z(0) = 0 or Z(1) = 0 an equilibrium trivially exists. Assume now Z(0) > 0
and Z(1) < 0, then either an equilibrium exists or there is a limit cycle, since
otherwise there is not a way to have Z(1) < 0 starting from Z(0) > 0.
8In order to explain better this result, the dynamics of the system must be introduced.
This would be discussed in the next Section.
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qc
γ∗∗
r
γ∗ γ
Z2(γ)
Z1(γ)
Z3(γ)
Z(γ)
Figure 2: Graph of the excess demand function. The double circle highlights the presence
of a limit cycle. Values of parameters: c = 2, φ = 0.7, σ = 0.8, q¯ = 1.2, L = 100, α = 0.9,
β = 0.85, B = 6, A = 6.
5 Dynamics
Let us assume that at a certain instant γ = γ0, with Z(γ0) > 0, i.e. there
is an excess of demand in the T-sector and an excess of supply in the E-
sector. Since we defined the traditional commodity as numeraire, market
forces tend to reduce the relative price of the ethical goods, i.e. pE decreases.
Since the price of the E-sector is decreasing in γ, the reduction in pE induces
an increase in γ. The change in γ modifies the distribution in the economy.
However, from inequality (26), an increase in γ implies a decrease in the
demand of the T-sector. Hence, as expected, the reduction in the price
of ethical goods induces an increase in the demand of the E-sector. This
adjustment process continues until the relative price of ethical goods is such
that Z(γ) = 0.
In other words, the univocal relation between pE and γ allows us to
consider the dynamics of the model in terms of Z(γ) and γ. We capture the
movement of the system through the following dynamics,
γ˙t = h(Z(γt)), (31)
where t is the time index, γ˙t ≡ dγtdt , dh(Z)dZ > 0, and γ˙t = 0 ⇔ h(0) = 0,
that is when the economy is at equilibrium. As we pointed out in Section 4,
the model can admit multiple equilibria, hence initial conditions determine
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which equilibrium arises. Internal equilibria, if they exist, are always locally
stable since the derivative of each excess demand function with respect to
γ is always negative. The equilibrium γ = 1, if it exists, is always locally
stable since the sign of γ˙t in the left interval of γ∗ = 1 is positive.
The basin of attraction of any equilibrium for γ ∈ [0, 1] is given by the
interval defined by the maximum γ in which Z(γ) < 0 for any γ < γ∗Zi ;
and by the minimum γ in which Z(γ) > 0 for any γ > γ∗Zi . If these two
values do not exist the boundaries are γ = 0 and γ = 1 respectively. For
instance, let us consider Figure 1. The basin of attraction of γ∗Z1 is defined
in the interval [0, γ¯]. For γ = γ¯ the excess demand function jumps to the
function Z2(γ), while the basin of attraction of γ∗Z2 is included in (γ¯, 1]. The
second discontinuity for γ = γ¯ do not affect the basins of attractions of any
equilibria since the sign of Z(γ) does not change.
Figure 2 shows the phase diagram of the model with the presence of a
stable limit cycle around γ∗∗ – marked with a double circle. On the left of
γ∗∗ there is an excess of demand in the T-sector, hence γ tends to increase.
By contrast, on its right side there is an excess of supply, hence γ tends to
decrease. This dynamics generate a fixed point of second order.
6 CSR growth and Income Inequality
The expansion of the E-sector affects income inequality in the economy
since at different values of γ are associated different levels of wage and total
profits – see equations (12) and (15). This issue is relevant because i) the
model admits multiple equilibria, hence the emergence of one equilibrium
or another also affects the degree of inequality; ii) policies on preferences
and income distribution shape the demand in the two sectors moving the
equilibrium and its basin of attraction.
We define as virtuous circle a trajectory of γ which associates an ex-
pansion of the E-sector to a reduction of income inequality and viceversa.
The central question of this paper is to study under which conditions the
described virtuous circle emerges. In order to investigate this issue, in Ap-
pendix A.1 we compute the Gini Index for this economy, G(γ), as an index
6 CSR growth and Income Inequality 15
of income inequality.9 Then it holds
G(γ) = (1− σ)(α− β)γ + β(1− α)
(α− β)γ + β . (32)
Proposition 6.1 presents the results on the relation between the Gini Index
and γ.
Proposition 6.1. If α > β, then ∂G(γ)∂γ > 0, for any γ ∈ [0, 1]. Otherwise,
∂G(γ)
∂γ ≤ 0, for any γ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. From equation (32), it holds
∂G(γ)
∂γ
=
α(α− β)(1− σ)
[αβ − α− β − γ(α− β)]2 . (33)
This derivative is positive for α > β, while it is non-positive otherwise.
When the derivative of the Gini Index with respect to γ is positive, any
expansion of the E-sector – that is a reduction in γ – reduces the inequality
in the economy. Proposition 6.1 proves that this result holds if and only
if the share of product going to workers in the E-sector is higher than the
corresponding share in the T-sector, that is α > β.10
For instance, in Figures 1 and 2, α > β, hence given Proposition 6.1
starting from a small E-sector (γ close to 1), its expansion (driven by the
dynamics of the model) induces a reduction of income inequality: that is a
virtuous circle. However, in Figure 2 the trajectory of γ tends to a limit
cycle around γ∗∗ while, in Figure 1, the trajectory tends to the equilibrium
γ∗Z2 . Hence the model generates qualitative different scenarios. For instance,
in Figure 1, the increase of the E-sector is significantly higher than that in
Figure 2. Policy makers through distributional and preference levers may
shape the demand in the two sectors, shifting the equilibria and the size of
their basins of attraction. In the next Section we investigate the impact of
those policies on the two goals: reduction of inequality and expansion of the
ethical sector; that is on the building of a virtuous circle.
9As it is well known, the Gini Index is an increasing function of income inequality. In
particular when G(γ) = 0, the inequality is minimal (all the consumers have the same
income), while when G(γ) = 1, the inequality is greatest.
10It seems reasonable that in real economies the share of product going to profits is
lower in the E-sector than in the traditional one, since the respect of criteria, especially
labour ones, can easily induce a reduction in the share of profits.
7 Policy Implications 16
7 Policy Implications
We concentrate our analysis on two kinds of policies, that affect preferences
– through φ – and income distribution – through parameter σ.11 The model
shows the following two properties:
a) Parameter φ does not influence w, w + θ and pE q¯. Hence the values
of γ in correspondence of which the excess demand function is discon-
tinuous do not vary through changes in φ. By contrast, φ influences
Z1 and Z2 with dZ1dφ <
dZ2
dφ <
dZ3
dφ = 0. Hence an increase in φ induces
a lower value of γ∗Z1 and γ
∗
Z2
.12
b) Parameter σ influences w + θ with d(w+θ)dσ < 0. This implies that
intervals in which Z2 and Z3 are defined can be influenced by σ. This
happens when w + θ intersects pE q¯. Moreover σ influences Z2 with
dZ2
dσ < 0 =
dZ1
dσ =
dZ3
dσ . Hence an increase in σ induces a lower value of
γ∗Z2 .
Let us assume that the economy is at equilibrium γ∗Z1 or γ
∗
Z2
and policy
maker induces an increase in φ. This change always causes an expansion of
ethical sector. Indeed, the T-sector switches from an equilibrium position
to an excess of supply. This in turns leads to a reduction in γ∗ and the
extent of the E-sector increases (see Property “a” above). Since changes
in preferences do not affect the income distribution, if the economy is at
equilibrium γ∗Z3 – i.e. no one in the economy can afford the ethical good –
changes in preferences cannot play any role to induce the emergence of the
E-sector. Finally if the economy is at a limit cycle, the effects of an increase
in φ can produce different results whether the limit cycle is between Z3 and
Z2 or between Z2 and Z1. Indeed, while in the first case policy makers
cannot induce any change (since Z3 is fixed), in the latter the increase in φ
may induce the T-sector to switch from an excess of demand to an excess of
supply. Hence, the limit cycle disappears and the E-sector increases.
11There are other parameters which may affect income distribution (e.g. α and β) and
the behavior of consumers (e.g. q¯). However, given our framework σ and φ generate more
interesting results and can be easily influenced by policy makers.
12As we pointed out in Section 4, each γ∗Zj (j = 1, 2) may not be an equilibrium.
However, this result applies both when γ∗Zj is or is not an equilibrium.
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Differently from φ, σ does not affect preferences but may affect con-
sumers’ behavior through changes in income distribution. For instance, an
increase in σ reduces the income of consumers receiving the profits share,
but increase their number. As we pointed out in Property “b”, this implies
that both w + θ and the excess demand function Z2 shift down. Hence,
if the economy is at equilibrium γ∗Z1 any change in σ does not have any
consequence. Instead if the economy is at equilibrium γ∗Z2 , the increase in σ
implies an increase in the E-sector if the class of richest consumer can still
afford the ethical good. Otherwise, i.e. after the change in σ, w + θ < pE q¯,
no consumer can demand the ethical good and the T-sector faces an excess
of demand, thus γ∗ increases and the E-sector decreases. For γ = γ∗Z3 only a
reduction of σ may allow the emergence of the ethical sector, since a group
of consumer rich enough to afford the ethical good is necessary. When the
economy lies in a limit cycle between Z3 and Z2, w + θ = pE q¯; hence, the
increase in σ reduces the extent of the E-sector, since a lower number of
consumers may afford the ethical good. The opposite applies when σ de-
creases. Finally, if the economy lies in a limit cycle between Z2 and Z1, the
increase in σ has the same effect of an increase in φ.
Changes in the relative dimensions of the two sectors affect the level of
inequality in the economy. We can characterize the effect of changes of φ
and σ on the Gini index derived in the previous Section. Parameter φ does
not directly affect G(γ), see equation (32). However, as analyzed above,
changes in φ can affect the extent of the E-sector, and hence through γ the
level of inequality. By Proposition 6.1, we prove that for α > β, policies
on preferences that increase the extent of the E-sector result in a reduction
of inequality. Otherwise, policies on preference that increase the extent of
the E-sector result in an increase of inequality. In other words, when the
share of product going to workers in the E-sector is greater than that in the
T-sector, policies which induce an expansion of ethical sector also leads to
a reduction of inequality, i.e. policies produce a virtuous circle.
Parameters σ directly enter the Gini Index. Without considering the
effect of σ on γ, an increase in σ induces a reduction in the Gini Index,
see equation (32). However, as analyzed above, changes in σ can also affect
the extent of E-sector. The effect of γ on G(γ) is given by Proposition 6.1.
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Hence, if α > β policies that increase the extent of the E-sector, through
an increase in σ, also reduce income inequality, i.e. they produce a virtuous
circle. If instead α < β, while the increase in σ tends to reduce income
inequality, the increase in the E-sector goes in the opposite direction. Hence,
the dominant effect determines whether the inequality decreases, and hence
whether redistributive policies result in an expansion of E-sector. We found
that redistributive policies can generate a virtuous circle even if α < β. As
an example, Appendix A.2 shows that this result holds for a wide range of
parameters when the economy lies at the equilibrium γ∗Z2 .
Finally, it is possible that the increase in the E-sector is due to a reduc-
tion of σ. In this case, the effects of policies on σ and on the expansion of the
ethical sector work in the opposite directions of those illustrated above.13
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper introduces CSR differentiation in a general equilibrium model.
The main novelty is the analysis of the role of income distribution in CSR
growth. Using Occam’s razor, we made three simplifying assumptions: i) so-
cially responsible consumers cannot afford the ethical goods if their purchas-
ing power is not enough to buy a certain quantity; ii) if a socially responsible
consumer is reach enough, she totally spends her income in the CSR sector;
iii) there are only two classes of income, since profits are equally distributed
among a fraction of the labour force. As a consequence, the model admits
the existence of multiple equilibria, each of them characterized by a differ-
ent diffusion of CSR. Different hypotheses generate different scenarios but
do not change the finding that income inequality is a deterrent to the diffu-
sion of CSR. In our set-up, we found that when the share of product going
to workers is higher in the CSR sector than in the traditional one, there is a
virtuous circle which ties CSR growth to inequality reduction. In this case,
any policy which increases the demand for CSR commodities results in a
reduction of inequality. Otherwise, only redistributive policies can generate
the virtuous circle between those two policy targets. This result holds for a
13That is, when α > β changes in σ and γ conflictingly affect the Gini Index; while,
when α < β they work in the same direction.
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wide range of parameters.
The Lisbon Strategy identifies in CSR diffusion a valuable instrument
for Europe development. Our contribution argues that income distribution
and CSR cannot be independently analyzed.
A Appendixes
A.1 The Gini Index
The Gini Index is defined as the ratio of the area that lies between the line of equality and
the Lorenz curve (marked C in Figure A.1) over the total area under the line of equality
(the sum of areas A, B and C in Figure A.1), i.e. the Gini Index, G(γ) is given by the
ratio C
A+B+C
. Since in our model there are only two classes of income, the Lorenz curve
drawn in Figure A.1 is given by two segments of different shapes: in relative terms, w
y
for
the share of poorest workers and w+θ
y
for the share of richest ones, where y is the average
per capita income, i.e. y = w + Π
L
. The share of workers which does not receive profits
is 1 − σ, thus their cumulative income express in the vertical axis is y1 = wY (1 − σ). By
determining the areas A, B and C, it holds
G(γ) =
σ(1− σ)θ(γ)
w(γ) + σθ(γ)
. (34)
From equations (12), (19) and (34), we get equation (32) of Section 6.
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A.2 Policies and virtuous circle
Let us assume that the economy is located in γ∗Z2 . From (32), we have that σ influences
directly both the Gini Index and γ∗Z2 . Hence, to obtain the full effect of σ on the Gini
Index, we substitute γ∗Z2 in G(γ) and we compute the derivative
∂G(γ∗Z2 )
∂σ
:
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∂G(γ∗Z2)
∂σ
=
Aσ2 +Bσ + C
[1− φ(α− β)(1− σ)]2 , (35)
where
A = −φ2(α− β)2 < 0, (36)
B = 2φ(α− β)[1 + φ(α− β)] (37)
and
C = β − 1− φ(α− β)[1 + φ(α− β)]. (38)
From (35), it holds
∂G(γ∗Z2 )
∂σ
> 0 if and only if Aσ2 + Bσ + C > 0 and
∂G(γ∗Z2 )
∂σ
< 0
otherwise. The numerator of (35) is a second-order polynomial which can be represented
by a concave parabola – see (36) – whose roots are
σ1 =
φ(α− β) + 1 +√∆
φ(α− β) (39)
and
σ2 =
φ(α− β) + 1−√∆
φ(α− β) , (40)
with ∆ ≡ B2 − 4AC = φ(α− β) + β > 0 for any value of α, β and φ.
When α > β, σ1 > σ2 > 1 and hence Aσ
2 +Bσ+C < 0 for any σ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore,
∂G(γ∗Z2 )
∂σ
< 0. If instead α < β, σ1 < 0 and the sign of σ2 depend on α, β and φ. In
particular:
• If β < 3
4
for any α ∈ [0, 1], σ1 < σ2 < 0. Hence Aσ2 +Bσ+C < 0 for any σ ∈ [0, 1]
and
∂G(γ∗Z2 )
∂σ
< 0.
• If 3
4
< β < 1 + α−√α and 1
4
< α < 1, σ1 < σ2 < 0. Hence Aσ
2 +Bσ +C < 0 for
any σ ∈ [0, 1] and ∂G(γ
∗
Z2
)
∂σ
< 0.
• If 3
4
< β < 1 + α − √α and α < 1
4
, σ1 < σ2 < 0 for φ <
−1+√−3+4β
2(α−β) or
φ > −1−
√−3+4β
2(α−β) , and 0 < σ2 < 1 for
−1+√−3+4β
2(α−β) < φ <
−1−√−3+4β
2(α−β) . Hence,
if φ < −1+
√−3+4β
2(α−β) or φ >
−1−√−3+4β
2(α−β) ,
∂G(γ∗Z2 )
∂σ
< 0 for any σ ∈ [0, 1], while,
for −1+
√−3+4β
2(α−β) < φ <
−1−√−3+4β
2(α−β) ,
∂G(γ∗Z2 )
∂σ
< 0 if and only if σ2 < σ < 1, and
∂G(γ∗Z2 )
∂σ
> 0 if and only if 0 < σ < σ2.
• If 1+α−√α < β < 1, α < 1
4
and α > 1
2
, then σ1 < σ2 < 0 for 0 < φ <
−1+√−3+4β
2(α−β) ,
and 0 < σ2 < 1 for
−1+√−3+4β
2(α−β) < φ < 1. Hence, if 0 < φ <
−1+√−3+4β
2(α−β) ,
∂G(γ∗Z2 )
∂σ
< 0 for any σ ∈ [0, 1], while, for −1+
√−3+4β
2(α−β) < φ < 1,
∂G(γ∗Z2 )
∂σ
< 0 if and
only if σ2 < σ < 1, and
∂G(γ∗Z2 )
∂σ
> 0 if and only if 0 < σ < σ2.
• Finally, if 1 + α − √α < β < 1, 1
4
< α < 1
2
, then results on Gini are identical to
the case 3
4
< β < 1 + α−√α and α < 1
4
.
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